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1 INTRODUCTION
In his study of the sources of competitive advantage
of countries, Porter (1990) argues that Korea can no
longer retain a competitive advantage on the basis of
producing low-cost products by means of cheap
labour and subsidized investment:
Cost competition in price-sensitive segments is
frequently unprofitable. Such strategies are al-
ways vulnerable to the next low labour cost
nation, or to the next nation such as Malaysia or
Thailand willing to subsidize construction of
large, modern plants. Korean firms now invari-
ably compete with cost-based strategies. They
must upgrade their competitive advantages and
learn to compete on differentiation, a process
that may require decades.
(Porter 1990: 688)
Porter sees upgrading of competitive advantage
predominantly in terms of innovation. A broader
way of approaching this issue is to say that Korean
firms need to improve the quality of their products.
Korean firms are having increasing difficulty in
competing with low-cost producers in the lower
strata of markets. Therefore, they need to upgrade
their products, offering improved product specifica-
tion, a more differentiated and rapidly changing
product range, and greater reliability - products
which do what they are supposed to do. All this
needs to be done at a reasonable price.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, Korean firms relied on
a depreciating currency and low wage costs to se-
cure competitive advantage. However, the success
of Korean manufacturing exporters, particularly, in
the USA led to pressure for currency revaluation.
Similarly, rapid economic growth (11.2 per cent per
annum 1983-88) led to shortages of labour and rap-
idly rising real wages. While rising wages and an
appreciating currency might be seen as the price of
success and part of the process of industrial upgrad-
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ing. the sharpness of both movements in the late
1980s has been seen by many commentators in Korea
as a serious problem. They seem to threaten the basis
of past success.
Upgrading is certainly the route Korean industry
has to take in the medium term. There is simply no
way it can compete in certain market segments with
the lower-wage Asian economies such as Thailand
and, above all, China. However, the question arises
as to whether the Korean economy has the means to
repeat in higher-quality market segments the suc-
cess it has enjoyed in the past 10-15 years in the lower
segments of the market. Following a brief outline of
cost and quality issues, the remainder of this article
will discuss briefly the factors which are likely to
influence the success of Korean firms in introducing
quality strategies in manufacturing which centre on
the involvement of labour and changes to quality
processes at the point of production. The items
considered are the promotion of quality manage-
ment by the State, education and training, industrial
relations and inter-firm relations.
2 COST AND QUALITY
Two major factors seem to have created a certain
crisis of confidence among Korean manufacturers at
the end of the 1980s. The first factor is a loss of
competitiveness arising from a combination of higher
price inflation in Korea than in major export destina-
tions, much higher wage rises in manufacturing
industry and a marked appreciation of the won
against the currencies of major trading partners.
This loss of competitiveness contrasted sharply to
the situation earlier in the decade, as can be seen in
Table 1. Table 1 presents data on movements in
wholesale prices, manufacturing wages and nomi-
nal exchange rates for Korea and for seven of Korea's
eight largest export destinations in 1990. Figures for
the period 1982-86 are contrasted with figures for
1986-90. The competitive position of Korean manu-
research, the ODA, who provided financial support, and Raphael
Kaplinsky, Hubert Schmitz and Lim Chai-Sung, who provided
valuable comments on an earlier version of this article.
Table 1: Real effective exchange rates for Korean exporters of manufactures, 1982-86 and 1986-90
Notes: (a) Eight major export destinations, less Hong Kong: USA, Japan, UK, Germany, France,
Singapore and Taiwan
(b) A figure greater than 100 represents a depreciation of the currency in nominal terms.
(c [(1)x(5)l/(2).
(d Unweighted average.
Source: Price indices, wage indices and exchange rates taken from KFTA (1992).
facturing will be influenced by price movements,
particularly of wholesale prices, in Korea relative to
those in its major trading partners, and by move-
ments in manufacturing wages and nominal ex-
change rates.
In the period 1982-86, wholesale prices rose by simi-
lar amounts in Korea and the export destinations
(Table 1, lines I and 2). Manufacturing wages rose
more in Korea in the period (lines 3 and 4), but this
rise was more than offset by a depreciation of the
won (line 5). The real effective exchange rate for
Korea, based on wholesale prices, depreciated by
26.8 per cent, giving Korean manufacturers a big
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advantage in the period. The gains were particularly
marked in relation to Japan (line 9).
In the second period, 1986-90, Korean wholesale
price rises matched those of its trading partners,
largely as a result of an appreciation of the won
(which cheapened imported inputs into industry).
As a result, the real effective exchange rate against
the seven trading partners based on wholesale prices
appreciated by 7.1 per cent. Against the two major
export destinations, the USA and Japan, the appre-
ciation was about 10 per cent (lines 8 and 9). In this
same period, Korean manufacturers faced intense
pressure on wage costs. Nominal wages in manu-






(1) Seven Major Trading Partners 98.5 109.9
(2) Korea 100.3 109.1
Manufacturing Wages
(3) Seven Major Trading Partners 115.7 116.9
(4) Korea 145.7 200.6
(5) Nominal Exchange Rate 129.2 92.3
Real Effective Exchange Rate (Korea and 7 partners)
(6) Wholesale Prices 126.8 92.9
(7) Manufacturing Wages 102.6 53.8
Real Effective Exchange Rate (wholesale prices)
(8) USA 114.9 88.4
(9) Japan 146.9 90.3
(10) Singapore/Taiwan 104.4 99.7
Real Effective Exchange Rate (manufacturing wages)
(12) USA 130.4 85.4
(13) Japan 130.7 56.8
(14) Singapore/Taiwan 104.9 82.9
facturing doubled in Korea in 4 years, while in
competitor countries, the increase was limited to
16.9 per cent (lines 3 and 4).
Particularly worrying for Korean industry was the
deterioration in competitiveness in relation to the
other leading East Asian exporters, Hong Kong,
Singapore and Taiwan, in the latter part of the 1980s.
Table 1 compares Korea's performance with that of
Singapore and Taiwan. While wholesale prices rose
faster in Korea, this was offset by a continued depre-
ciation of the won against the currencies of Singa-
pore and Taiwan. The real effective exchange rate
based on wholesale prices hardly moved from 1986
to 1990 (line 10). However, the wage comparison is
much less favourable to Korea. Manufacturing wages
rose rapidly in nominal terms in Singapore and
Taiwan between 1986 and 1990 (by 53.4 per cent and
58.5 per cent respectively), but in Korea the rise was
much greater (line 4). As a result, Korean manufac-
turers faced a rise in relative wages of 17.1 per cent
(line 14). The only means of controlling wage costs
would have been for productivity to have been
rising faster in Korean manufacturing. In the period
1982-86, productivity in Korean manufacturing did
indeed rise faster than in Singapore and Taiwan.
However, the opposite was true for the period 1986-
90 (KPC 1991: 51). Just when Korean firms needed
an increased productivity boost to offset rising wages,
they began to fall behind their closest rivals.
The second major concern for Korean manufactur-
ers is quality. An upgrading strategy which would
move Korean manufactured products up-market
and away from the goods produced by lower-cost
Asian rivals would certainly involve improvements
in quality - in terms of both specification and con-
formance. The quality of Korean products is still
perceived to be low, and set-backs in certain key
markets are an indication of this. Initial penetration
in the US car market, for example, was undermined
by poor quality. According to Womack, Jones and
Roos (1990: 262):
By 1988, the Korean producers were selling
500,000 cars in the United States, accounting for
4 per cent of the total market. Then the Korean
2 The figures cited by Cho and by Womack, Jones and Roos do not
match. Both agree on Hyundai's defect rate in 1987, but Cho gives a
defect rate for Honda of 1.5 per car, and for Toyota of 1.35. Womack,
Jones and Roos cite a figure of 0.6 for Japanese cars.
This information was provided verbally by Ms Junko Mizuno,
Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo.
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strategy fell apart ... When the Korean currency
began to strengthen rapidly against the dollar in
1988, and Korean auto workers demanded large
wage increases, a large part of the Korean's cost
advantage disappeared. At that point, the ques-
tion of quality emerged. The early Hyundai cars
sold in the United States had very poor quality
In 1987, when the average Japanese car was
reported by consumers to have about 0.6 defects,
the Hyundai cars had 3.1.
While Hyundai has made great efforts to improve
quality, more recent data for 1991 show its defect
rate was still more than double that of Honda. More
significantly, Hyundai still lagged behind GM and
Ford in terms of defects per car (Cho 1992: 146).2
There is other evidence which suggests that Korean
quality improvement still has a long way to go. A
study of 513 small- and medium-sized components
producers carried out by the Korean Small Business
Federation revealed a widespread concern that Ko-
rean firms were lagging behind their Japanese equiva-
lents in terms of product quality, design and price
and expect to be under threat from products from
Thailand and China (among other countries) within
five years. Over 60 per cent of the sample thought
their quality was inferior to the Japanese, 56 per cent
said design and packaging were mediocre and 40
per cent believed they were less competitive than the
Japanese on price (ACCK 1992: 57). Comparative
research on producers in Japan and Korea reinforces
this picture. Overall, quality is lower in Korean
firms, and large companies such as Hyundai have
not yet developed networks of suppliers with Qual-
ity Assurance.3
Worse still, there was a perception that at the end of
the 1980s the overall quality of Korean exports was
deteriorating, notwithstanding the improvements
registered by firms such as Hyundai. One source on
the quality of exports registered a doubling of the
failure rate of exported goods between 1988 and
1990.
This figure is taken from a discussion document on implementing
a new approach to quality circulated by the Industrial Advancement
Administration.
3 GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF QUALITY
INITIATIVES
The Korean government seems to be aware of the
need to upgrade manufacturing and improve qual-
ity. Efforts are being made in a number of areas,
including the implementation of Iso 9000 (see the
Appendix to the Introduction to this Bulletin) and
the introduction of quality management. Given the
Korean government's strong record in industrial
promotion, this support is a strong factor in favour
of quality improvement in industry.
The ISO 9000 standards concern total quality man-
agement. The Korean government incorporated ISO
9000/4 into Korean standards KS 9000/4 in April
1992. The Industrial Advancement Administration
(IAA) will act as the accreditation body which recog-
nizes certification agencies. These will then use
auditors to check companies, products and proc-
esses and recognize them as conforming to KS 9000/
4. The Korean Standards Association (KSA) is at the
heart of this process. It prepared the accreditation
and certification schemes, will act as a leading certi-
fication body, and is responsible for the training of
the auditors who will have the job of certifying
particular processes and products. The whole sys-
tem should be in operation in 1993, and if firms seek
product certification then they will have to introduce
TQC.
The IAA is also proposing the promotion of what is
referred to as Quality Management (QM) through-
out large firms in industry. This is in effect TQC. A
proposal for diffusing quality awareness and manu-
facturing has already been widely circulated and
discussed with industry. This diagnoses poor qual-
ity as a major problem for manufacturing and argues
in favour of a new approach to quality, based on the
production of quality at source and the involvement
of employees in quality achievement.
The IAA proposal places great emphasis on the
involvement of employees at all levels in quality,
and the implementation of continuous improve-
ment (kaizen) based on the voluntary participation
of workers in small group activities.5 The aim is to
extend these practices from the most advanced firms
to the rest of manufacturing. The IAA proposes to
do this by:
These proposals are taken from the document circulated by the
JAA (see Note 4).
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I training of workers in export industries, provid-
ing training materials and guides to QM;
2 developing QM capacity by such means as oblig-
ing firms with 50 or more employees to introduce
QM teams, creating regional QM institutes, insti-
tuting a biannual QM competition, creating mod-
els for QM and Quality Circles for different sizes
and sectors of firms, and selecting and rewarding
quality specialists;
3 creating a one-year course with a capacity for 100
people to turn quality control technicians into
Quality Management leaders.
These proposals for government action in the area of
quality promotion have not all been implemented or
accepted. However, the Korean government does
seem prepared to put considerable resources into
promoting QM and ISO 9000. It may also seek to use
sticks as well as carrots, backing up some of the
proposals with legal force and taking firms' re-
sponses to these initiatives as one of the factors
which determine access to government credit.
However, there are limits to what even the Korean
government can achieve in this area. The changes
being proposed go to the heart of company organi-
zation and culture, shifting not only perceptions of
what quality is and how it can be achieved, but also
relations between management and labour and the
basic activities of shop floor workers. When such
significant changes are demanded, there is a danger
that firms will formally adopt those elements which
are required by the State - quality circles, for example
- but be unable or unwilling to make the thorough-
going changes in company culture and organization
needed to make new quality strategies effective (see
Fleury's article in this Bulletin).
The remainder of this article discusses some of the
factors which will affect the extent to which compa-
nies can successfully introduce JIT/TQC. The fac-
tors considered are education and training, labour
relations and relations between large and small firms.
4 EDUCATION AND TRAINING
Across the world, quality strategies involve raising
the educational standards of labour at all levels -
from managers and engineers to shop floor produc-
tion workers. Engineers and technical staff are
ids bulletin vol 24 no 2 1993
important, because with JIT/TQC production proc-
esses have to be brought under control and their
limits and tolerances fully understood if techniques
such as SPC are to be introduced. Similarly, the
process of continuous improvement requires ma-
chinery to be modified and adjusted in the light of
shop floor experience. This requires a thorough
understanding of it and the capacity to make minor
innovations.
Larger Korean manufacturing firms are in a good
position with respect to overall technological capa-
bility. There has been major investment in tertiary
level education. Korea has a higher proportion of
scientists and engineers in its population than any
other newly industrializing country (Kim 1989: 118).
There have been major successes in upgrading facili-
ties. The State-owned steel company, POSCO, for
example, was able to improve a turnkey plant bought
from the Japanese and steadily reduce the propor-
tion of foreign engineering inputs into subsequent
expansions of capacity (Kim 1989: 125).6
Compared to other Newly Industrializing Coun-
tries, therefore, Korean firms should find it rela-
tively easy to provide the technical support for JIT/
TQC. Indeed, Amsden argues that competence in
making technologies work and making 'incremen-
tal, yet cumulative, improvements in productivity'
(1990: 17-18) is one of the basic elements of competi-
tiveness at the present time, and one in which Korean
companies excel.
However, JIT/TQC also involves production work-
ers taking on new tasks, responding to unforeseen
events and contributing to the improvement of pro-
duction processes. Workers have to have the compe-
tence and the motivation to take on these new re-
sponsibilities. The question of motivation is dis-
cussed in the next Section. Here, the focus is on
competence.
JIT/TQC puts a considerable premium on literacy,
numeracy, reasoning and communication skills.
These are provided by a good basic education. Com-
pared to many other countries, the Korean educa-
tional system has provided these in abundance.
6 While POSCO may be the exception among Korean firms in its
long-term commitment to Human Resources development, it is
worth noting that Dore uses the case of a turnkey Japanese-built steel
plant in Italy to illustrate the pit-falls of not learning and continually
upgrading facilities (Dore 1989: 102).
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Korean achievements in the educational field have
been impressive, outstripping other industrializing
Third World countries such as Singapore, Argen-
tina, Brazil and Mexico by the end of the 1970s
(Amsden 1989: 218).
In addition to a reasonable standard of education,
the adoption of JIT/TQC involves a broad, plant-
based approach to training, and here Korea's advan-
tages are less clear. The vocational training system
in Korea designates in-plant training as the source of
less complex skills (Ministry of Labour 1992b: 15),
and since 1974 a series of laws has been passed to
encourage larger firms to undertake in-plant train-
ing.7 In spite of these laws, Korean firms have been
reluctant to engage in formal in-plant training of
their blue-collar employees. Faced with the choice of
paying a training levy or providing in-plant training,
even large firms preferred paying a training levy to
providing their workers with in-plant training' (Bai
1989: 19). By 1988, only 13.4 per cent of the 1,573
firms obliged to provide training or pay the levy
chose the former option, and this proportion had
fallen steadily in the course of the 1980s (Bai 1989:
19).
Given this record, it is not clear that firms will be
willing or able to provide extensive, short-duration
courses on such topics as SPC, elements of kanban,
use of measuring instruments etc.. The vocational
training which does occur in-plant in the metal-
working and electrical industries, is oriented to such
long-established skills as welding, lathe operation,
crane operation and sheet metalworking, rather than
the new competences required by JIT/TQC (Minis-
try of Labour 1992b: 42-43). If the vocational training
system is not to be used as the basis for JIT/TQC
training, then firms will have to seek other sources
for the know-how to provide extensive training.
It seems to be the case that various training agencies
are making efforts to provide relevant courses. For
example, the KSA's 1992 training programme in-
cludes training at all levels - from production work-
ers, technical staff and management - in such areas as
Quality Circles, TQC, ISO 9000 and preventive main-
tenance. A number of courses of 3-4 days' duration
The Korean Manpower Agency (KMA), formerly known as the
Korean Vocational Training and Manpower Agency (KOVTMA) is
responsible for part of this training and for the certification system
linked to it.
are on offer with titles such as 'Basic QC Circle
Activity', 'Training for QC Circle Activity Leaders'
and 'QC Circle Activity and Problem-Solving Meth-
ods'. It remains to be seen whether or not firms will
take advantage of such courses or provide their own
in-house training for JIT/TQC. At the very least,
such a step would mean a change in the degree and
direction of in-plant training.8
5 LABOUR RELATIONS
Involving labour in quality by means of Quality
Circles, the fusing of quality and production tasks,
Statistical Process Control and team-working re-
quires that labour should be either actively commit-
ted to the company's quality programme or at least
compliant with the demands made by it. Firms
secure this consent/compliance through a combina-
tion of actively motivating workers towards com-
pany goals and controlling both collective and indi-
vidual resistance to the requirements of the com-
pany.9 Both motivation and control are problematic
in Korea at the present time.
The general style of Korean management is marked
by authoritarian patterns of conflict resolution, a
top-down style and low levels of group decision-
making, according to a survey of attitudes by Chung
and Lee (1989: 177). Until 1987, this system worked
well because the State was willing and able to keep
labour under control. Since mid-1987, the State has
played a less active role in labour control and an
upsurge in labour militancy has led to considerable
conflict between management and labour. The
mechanisms which were designed to demobilize
and fragment labour in a period of repression -
plant- and company-based unions (the only ones
allowed by the 1980 labour legislation) and plant
level bargaining - have now allowed union organi.
In the case of large companies, labour turnover should not be a
barrier to investment in training. Turnover in Koreanmanufacturing
remains high, at approximately five percent per month in 1991-92
(Ministry of Labour 1991, 1992a), and there is evidence to show that
turnover is relatively high among workers with five or more years in
a job (Lee 1991: 55). However, turnover is generally lower in larger
firms, and lower in sectors such as chemicals, steel and machinery and
equipment. In some large firms turnover rates were very low. At
Hyundai, turnover was under ten per cent per annum in 1991 (Cho
1992), and at the Kia Car Company's Sohari plant turnover declined
from 7.4 percentin 1987 to 5.0 per cent in 1991 (company information).
For a discussion of the balance between consent and compliance
in JIT/TQC systems, see Humphrey (1992).
10 The restriction of unions to plant and company level in 1980
contrasts markedly with the situation in Brazil described in the
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zations to expand rapidly and maintain close ties
with workers in plants. According to Park and Park
(1991: 5) the number of unionized establishments
tripled in the 30 months following July 1987, and
unionization developed strongly in large factories in
heavy industries, such as vehicles, shipbuilding and
machinery. These sectors are crucial for the export
drive. The new unions have been particularly active
and effective in the large plants owned by the Korean
conglomerates, the chaebois (Deyo 1990: 228).°
In a situation of a release of pent-up frustrations and
the emergence of new union leaderships which have
not been drawn into established procedures, indus-
trial relations are bound to be difficult. Korean
managements were clearly unprepared to cope with
the new situation, and both sides have resorted to
industrial action and conflict very quickly. Accord-
ing to Wilkinson (1982: 26):
The responses of employers to the assertion of
trade union strength since 1987 have been varied
and complex, but overall fighting workers head
on has been the option favoured over more
accommodative means.
Management and the State have lacked means of
formalizing and controlling collective bargaining
and industrial disputes. The institutions which might
regulate labour relations, such as the Labour-Man-
agement councils, State arbitration and mediation
services, and national wage guidelines do not have
the support of either management or labour or
both.'1
The result of this unresolved conflict is that many
Korean firms have neither the trust and commitment
of labour nor the control necessary to impose new
working practices. To some extent the most difficult
period of conflict has already past, but as Wilkinson
articles by Ruas and by Franzoi and Rodrigues in this Bulletin. In
Brazil, unions are organized at municipal or regional level and have
little plant-based organization. In Korea, the union legislation in 1980
which banned national unions was meant to demobilize labour. Since
1987 it has had the effect of strengthening the links with their rank-
and-file workers and concentrating attention on factory issues, such
as functional flexibility (see the Appendix to the Introduction to this
Bulletin) and the authoritarianism of first-line supervisors. In an
effort to bring some order into the bargaining process in Korea, the
law has been changed to allow regional or national bargaining, but
local union leaders are reluctant to cede this source of power and
influence (Park and Park 1991: 21-22).
' For more discussion of these points, see Wilkinson (1992) and
Bognanno (1988).
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points out, this cannot be attributed to the success of
management and the State is developing legitimate
means of resolving grievances (1992: 18-19). Rather,
a combination of a slow-down in economic growth,
and State harassment of union leaders maybe slowly
demobilizing the labour movement. This means
that strikes and disputes at plant level may be con-
tained, but managements will not have obtained
labour's support. The gains workers have made in
terms of dignity and self-respect since 1987 will be
hard for managements to undermine. Workers and
their unions are likely to resist changes to working
practices which demand greater flexibility or in-
crease the intensity of work, and they will remain
suspicious of management's motives.
The situation is not impossible for management. To
some extent, Korean managers face similar prob-
lems to those faced by managers in Brazil, and as can
be seen from the articles in this Bulletin, this has not
stopped change. However, Brazilian managers could
'buy' cooperation by raising wages and offering
stability of employment (Fleury and Humphrey
1992: 52-60). In Korea, workers have rights to stabil-
ity of employment (in fact the government and
employers have been trying to undermine this right
in the Courts). Similarly, the unions and plant-level
organization have succeeded in greatly increasing
real wages, reducing the working week and control-
ling the level of overtime. Having achieved so much
through mobilization and opposition after 1987,
unions will not be inclined to make major conces-
sions. It remains to be seen how leading companies
resolve this problem. Some companies certainly will
- either by keeping the union at bay, or by negotiat-
ing change - but the poor state of labour-manage-
ment relations will hamper the generalized intro-
duction of elements of JIT and TQC. Both the State
and management need to work out a new strategy
towards labour which takes account of the enor-
mous changes which have taken place since 1987.
6 SUPPLIER RELATIONS
The final question considered in this article is rela-
tions between large firms and their suppliers. A
feature of JIT/TQC is the development of new rela-
tions with suppliers. It is well known that leading
Japanese firms contract out a higher proportion of
production activities than Western firms, but they
restrict their suppliers to a relatively small number
of firms which maintain close ties. In Korea, the
chaebois (large conglomerates) are highly diversified
2lnformation provided verbally to the author.
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both horizontally and vertically, and there is a big
gap between leading firms and smaller components
suppliers. Large firms have yet to develop networks
of suppliers with whom they maintain close ties.
Mizuno has found that those suppliers in Korea
which either (i) supply most of a large company's
input of a product or (ii) send most of their output to
one large firm do, in fact, have adequate standards of
quality. However, a much smaller proportion of
suppliers have such a close relation to their large
customers in Korea than is the case in Japan.12
Large Korean firms will have to work hard to raise
standards among their suppliers. Samsung, one of
the leading firms in this area, has a 200-strong task-
force dedicated to upgrading suppliers, and it has
plans to reduce the number of first-tier suppliers
from 400 to 50. It is providing low cost loans to help
finance the investments needed for upgrading. Other
companies will need to do the same. However, as
Marx's article on Brazil in this Bulletin shows clearly,
suppliers may be unwilling or unable to cooperate.
They may not have the human resources needed for
upgrading, and the high rates of turnover in smaller
firms (over five per cent per month in 1991-92) may
inhibit investment in training. Once again, Korean
firms may be able to resolve these difficulties, but a
major challenge lies ahead.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Korea is facing the difficult task of moving its manu-
factured exports upmarket. Having been phenom-
enally successful at producing large quantities of
products aimed at the lower end of markets, it has to
seek to distance itself from newer industrializing
countries in Asia by improving both product speci-
fication and conformance to standards. Korea has a
number of advantages in its favour as it attempts to
make this shift. A long-term commitment to educa-
tion at all levels will continue to pay dividends, and
increasing investment in research and development,
combined with continued rapid growth will act as a
great spur to technological change. However, the
authoritarian style of Korean management, poor
labour relations and the low quality of components
supplied locally are major problems, and companies
and government will have to make efforts to over-
come them. There seems little doubt that larger
Korean firms will be able to introduce the technical
aspects of quality programmes. The challenge lies in
changing organizational hierarchies and labour-
management relations.
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